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My challen,;e today i5 lo resist the !ynnny of the news cycle and put the cun-ent crisis \,iLb Iraq in .
context. ! want to make clear 1he danger Saddam Hussein poses to his people, his neiglI~ors, Amenca
and the world. I want 10 explain whal \\elre doing about it -- in terms of the cuffellt cns1s o,:er Iraqis
weapons of mass de~truction program. And I want lo lay out our long term strateg)' for dealing with
\he clu·onic problem Lhat is Saddam Hussein.

_ ___,

Throughout his time in po•ver, Saddam has demonstrated again and again u tter contempt for his people,
tbe pea·:e of hi, region and the security of the world. He pursued a hon·if1c, decade-long war of
aLLrition a.gainsi Iran, costing at lea,t half a milli(m lives. He repeatedly unleashed chemical weapo~s
against Iran ls soldiers and fired SCUD~ into its cit_ies. In : 988, he g_assed Kurdish cmhans 111 No!·tnern
Iraq. In J990. his troops inYacle.d Kuwait executwg those _w_ho res1st~cl, loot_mg the ::::... nt_ry,_sethng_
fire to 600 oil wells. spilling teu~ of milli, '\ of gallons of 011 mto the Gulf, fmng S_CUD m:ssile, al I el
Aviv, Rivadh and ~ianama [mah-):AH-mahf. At warls encl, he brutally put down m his owr. country
the Km·d; and Shia Arabs \\ ho rose 11p in rev oh against him. He ordered an attempt on the life of
former President nush. Once again in 1994, he massed his army along the Kuwaiti border. Ile
forcdull v occupied Irbil in i'/orthern Iraq in 1996. And throughout the last two decade;, Saddam !:as
"v:lecfio de\'elop, maintain anti conceal the mosl tell'ible weapon~ kno·.vn to humanity ·· nuclear,
chemical and biological ·· and the mis5iles to deliver them.
The Cniled States has actively and ccnsislenlly opposed Saddam because he has demonstrated the
intent to threaten the stability of a region vital lo our interests. A stable :\·liddle East means we can
better protect the free flow of oil, fight terrorism and build 5upport for a comprehensive Middle East
peace. There is no greater challenge to the regionls stability-· and to Americals security in that region
-· 1han Saddamls red.less pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. As President Clinton has said, the
spread of the,e ·weapow, 10 outlaw states. and from them to ten-01i5ts and internalional criminals, is one
of the most dangerous security threats our people will face over the nexl generation. Other countries
have weapons of mass destruction am.I ballistic missiles. With Saddam Hussein, there is one big
difference: he has used them. Nol once, but repeatetlly. Not only against combatants. but against
civilians. ~ ol only against a foreign adversary, bul against his own people. And I have no doubt he
will use !hem again if his capacity lo rebuild his arsenal is left unchecked.
F-or the-bette:~part of this de'.'.-ade....lhe international community has \\-orl,,ed lo discover and dismantle
Iraqis W)!D program. At the end of the Gulf \Var, Iraq was girnn 15 days to inventory and prepare
for the destruction of its nuclear. chemical and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them.
The U.;s.· . sc.t up a special commission of international experts, called 1:NSCOM. to make sure th.at the
job got done -· and to monitor the situation so that Iraq did nol reconstitute its program.
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EYer since, Iraqb W[\11) compliance record had been a litany of lies, deceit and run-arounds. The full
disclosure document on missiles Baghdad was required to produce in fifteen days, it dclil'cred -- in fi,·e
years. \ Vhen LNSC0:\1 and the International Atomic Energy Agency uncovered facl6 that proved
Iraq Is biological. chemical and nuclear weapon, reports 10 be grossly in.iccurate, Baghdad simply
amended the reports. \\'hen Hussein Kamel [ka-MEL) -- Saddamls son-in-law and the architect of
Iraqis 'vV).fD program-· defected to Jordan in 1995, B.ighdad was forced to reveal additional weapons
stockpiles and production capacity it had insisted it did not have. Throughout, Baghdad has engaged
the l"NSC0:'11 ilispectors in a b.igh stakes game of cat-ancl-motkse -- lyi11g to Lhem, harassing them,
dela~·ing their acce,s to sites. flagrantly destroying e\'idence in plain view of the inspectors.
Yet de&pile Iraqis best efforts, the inspectors have done a remarkable job. They have found and
destroyed more of Iraq Is weapons of mass destrnction capacity than was destroyed during the Gulf
\Var itself. This includes nearly 40,000 chemical weapons. more than 100,000 gallons of chemical
weapons agents, 48 operational missiles, 30 warheads specially fitted for chemical and biological
weapons, and a mas,ive biological weapons factory at Al-Hakim equipped to produce deadly antlu·ax
and botulinum.
But CNSCOMls jc;> is not ye1 done. Stockpiies ol chemical and biological mu11itions and a small force
of Srnd-1ype missiles remain unaccounted for. Aud most iJ11portantly. lraq still has the capacity to
rebuild its prnduc1ion program for biological and chemical weapons and the missiles to deliver them.
As l.:"NSCOM has tome closer and closer to ferTeting out Iraqis remaining weapons capacity, Saddam
Jia.s_become increasingly determined in hi~ efforts to bloc.k the inspectors and end the inspection
regime.
Which brings us to the cwrent crisi~. Over the last three months, Saddam has sought to end
CNSCOl\.f by any and every ruse. First he demanded that American inspectors be removed from the
inspection team,. Then he tried to dictate a change in the \eamsl composition. Now he is denying
lJNSCO~I !he free and full access it mu~t have to all sites by designating some of them IPresidcmiall
sites or otherwise restricting the inspectors! accc~s. But as the charts behind me show, some of his
presidential compounds are literally city-sized -· one almost as large as the district of Columbia -· witlt
dozens of separate buildings.
At the same time, Saddam i~ scel..ing to end the economic sanctions imposed by the United ~ations
after the Gulf \Var·- and whic h should nol be lifted until Iraq complies with all L N. resolutions,
including those on WMD. His gaml>it is clear and presents a stark danger to our national interes(s.
Compromise l ;KSC0:0-lls integrity b~· imposing debiliLating rnndilions
nspectors and Saddam
keeps hi5 remaining weapons of mass destrnction and the capacity to p1
any m01e of them. Lift
the sanction, and Sadd am gets the money he needs to rebuild his militar.
II is a situation we cannot lolern{e. If Saddam defies international controls here with impunit y, he will
roll on. as he has before. energized by the conclusion that the international community lost its will.
Only our will has stopped him before. ll1e will of President Bush to lead the Gulf \.Var coalition that
ejected Iraq from Kuwait and imposed tough conditions for the cease·fire.
The will of President Clinton to strike hard at Iraqi intelligence headqua1ters in 1993 after its agents
ploiled to assassinate former President Bush. The will immediately to deploy our troops, ships and
planes lo Lhc region. as President Clinton did in 1994 when Saddam tlu·eatened to repeat his walkover
of Kuwait. The will to lake ou\ Iraqi air defenses and extend the No Fly Zone when Saddam forcefully
occupied Irbil in northern Iraq.
:S:ow, once again. we must su!lllnon the will to respond firmly to Saddamls challenge io Ul\SCO:\-f and
establish a safe haven for programs to develop weapon, of mass destruction. ·111at is exactly what we
arc doing. From Europe lo the Persian Gulf, there is widespread consensus that Iraq must meet all its
obligations lo the United Kations, that UKSCO!\f must be allowed to do its job effectively, and that. i1'
diplomacy fails. Saddam Ilus~ein will bear responsibility for the consequenc.es.
Many of our friends and allies would prefer a diplomatic solution. So would we. The UKSCOM
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system works -- thatls why Saddam is so desperate to end it. \Ve will spare no diplomatic effort to
gain unfettered access for UNSCOM and to assure i1 can clo its job effectively. We will not accept any
proposal that would weaken CNSCOMls effectiveness.
In pursuit of these objectives. President Clinton has been in conlacl \,ith his counterpai1s nearly every
day over the rasL few weeks. He dispatched Secretary Albright and Secretary Cohen to Europe and
the '-·liddle East-· a11d Ambassador Richardson literally around (he world. If there is a peaceful way to
convince Saddam to let UJ\SCO:\I complete its mission, we will pur~ue it until the end.
But if Iraq continues to tie U~SCOMls hands, as Chairman Butler has said, it cloesnlt much matter if
the in~pector; are holed up in a hotel in Baghdad. or in Bahrain, or in Boston. If they are not allowed
to do their job unhindered, we must be prepared to deal directly with (he threaL posed by Iraqis
weapons of mass de,lruction -- with force if necessary. Either Saddam Hussein acts -- or we mu• be
prepared to do so.
For the past several weeks, the C nited States has built up i1s forces in the Gulf. As I speak, two
American caJTier baltle groups and over 300 aircraft are in the region. They are joined by the British
aircraft can'ier Invincible. And we continue to receive support for action, should it prove necessary.
Our force posture in the region would not. be possible without the support of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Bahrain. the GCC states, and Turkey. And many friends and allies -- including the United Kingdom.
Germany, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Lhe Czech Republic, Australia, Kew Zealand
and Canada -- arc prepared to provide forces, bases or logistical support. That list is growing every
day.
Should such a mission prove necessary. its purpose is clear: to deliver a serious blow that will
significantly diminish Saddamls weapons of ma,s destruction threaL. and reduce his ability to threaten
his ueii;hbors. That is the objective we can and must meet to protect om· vital national in1erests.
The most difficult decision any President has to make is to pu( our troops in harmsl way. ~o military
mission i, without risk and cost. Even the bes{ prepared, best equipped forces will suffer losses. Bui
should force become necessarv, the safetv of our men and women in uniform will be President Clinton!
s top priority. And let me say: too, that. if military action becomes necessary, we will do what we can
to avoid civilian casual!ies.

If. in the aftermath of force, Iraq allows 1iNSCOM back in. so much the better. Unless it does so, !here
is no prospect for ending economic sanctions. But if it does not, herels bow the world will look to
Saddam in the weeks and moaths after force is used.
~--1~
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